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Abstract
Users trust IoT apps to control and automate their smart de-
vices. These apps necessarily have access to sensitive data to
implement their functionality. However, users lack visibility
into how their sensitive data is used (or leaked), and they of-
ten blindly trust the app developers. In this paper, we present
IOTWATCH, a novel dynamic analysis tool that uncovers the
privacy risks of IoT apps in real-time. We designed and built
IOTWATCH based on an IoT privacy survey that considers the
privacy needs of IoT users. IOTWATCH provides users with a
simple interface to specify their privacy preferences with an
IoT app. Then, in runtime, it analyzes both the data that is sent
out of the IoT app and its recipients using Natural Language
Processing (NLP) techniques. Moreover, IOTWATCH informs
the users with its findings to make them aware of the privacy
risks with the IoT app. We implemented IOTWATCH on real
IoT applications. Specifically, we analyzed 540 IoT apps to
train the NLP model and evaluate its effectiveness. IOTWATCH
successfully classifies IoT app data sent to external parties to
correct privacy labels with an average accuracy of 94.25%,
and flags IoT apps that leak privacy data to unauthorized par-
ties. Finally, IOTWATCH yields minimal overhead to an IoT
app’s execution, on average 105 ms additional latency.
1 Introduction
Users install IoT apps to manage and control smart devices
such as smart thermostats, door locks, and cameras. These
apps have access to sensitive information to implement their
functionalities, communicate to external servers, and send
notifications to users [4, 11, 33, 42, 47]. The sensitive infor-
mation is either obtained through APIs provided by IoT plat-
forms (e.g., whether the door is unlocked (door.unlocked)
or the lights are off in the kitchen (kitchenLights.off)); or
they are simple texts defined by a developer or user at install-
time, for instance “the door is open”, and “the kids returned
to home”. Previous research works have demonstrated that
IoT apps may leak sensitive information to unauthorized par-
ties [3, 10, 18, 39, 40]. Additionally, many IoT apps transmit
data to remote servers without users’ permission for data vi-
sualization and to profile user behaviors [1, 2], such as their
energy usage. However, users have no knowledge and control
over what type of sensitive data the apps access or who else
see these data [15].
With the rapidly growing ecosystem of IoT devices and
apps, users are oblivious to the privacy risks that IoT apps
pose. Previous works focus on analyzing the app’s context to
extract permissions from IoT apps [27, 41, 50]. Other works
use static analysis to find sensitive data-flows [10] or inter-rule
vulnerabilities in IoT deployments [51]. These approaches (al-
beit useful) have limitations in over-approximating data-leaks
or in accessing real IoT data to perform their evaluations. A
current dynamic method isolates sensitive data within sand-
boxes, which requires intensive developer effort [18]. Mainly,
none of the existing solutions consider sensitive data leaks
of untainted strings defined by a user or developer. In our
investigations, we have found that out of 540 analyzed IoT
apps, 64% of them potentially leak sensitive data through
simple strings. Lastly, current IoT systems do not consider
the privacy preferences of users into their implementations.
There exist effective privacy tools for the consumer in other
domains such as mobile phones [5, 16, 23, 35–37], yet these
cannot be applied to analyze privacy risks of IoT apps as
IoT apps possess unique challenges in terms of programming
languages and structures.
In this paper, we introduce IOTWATCH, a novel dynamic
analysis tool that uncovers the privacy risks of IoT apps at
runtime. We designed and built IOTWATCH based on an IoT
privacy survey of human subjects that use different IoT de-
vices. The survey aimed at understanding the privacy concerns
and expectations of users when they use IoT devices and apps.
IOTWATCH provides users with a simple interface that allows
them to specify their privacy preferences (e.g., location, de-
vice states, etc.) at install-time. It then adds extra logic to the
app’s source code to collect app information at runtime. The
collected information is used to classify the data sent out of
the IoT app into privacy preferences of users through Natural
Language Processing (NLP) techniques. Also, IOTWATCH
analyzes the recipients of the data and detects leaks to unau-
thorized parties. Finally, IOTWATCH notifies the users about
the sensitive data-leaks and privacy concerns in IoT apps,
allowing them to make informed decisions about their privacy.
Privacy concerns include any app behavior that would put the
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sensitive information at risk. For instance, an Internet com-
munication that sends the sensitive information to a remote
server in plain text.
To evaluate IOTWATCH, we trained an NLP model with IoT
strings extracted from 380 SmartThings market apps. The
model is used to classify IoT app strings (e.g., “the door is
locked”, and “kitchen lights are turned off”) to user privacy
preferences. Then, we analyzed 160 different IoT apps to
evaluate its accuracy at runtime. IOTWATCH successfully clas-
sified 146 IoT strings to privacy preferences with an average
accuracy of 94.25% and precision of 95%. Among its find-
ings, IOTWATCH also flags 35 IoT apps that leak sensitive
data to unauthorized recipients. Finally, IOTWATCH yields
minimal overhead to the IoT apps execution, introducing on
average 105 ms additional latency.
Summary of Contributions. The contributions of this work
are as follows:
• We conducted an IoT privacy survey with 123 IoT users
through a set of structured questions. Although the survey
is not the major focus of this work, it is instrumental for
the IoT community, researchers, and users to understand
users’ privacy concerns, their privacy preferences, and ex-
pectations when they use IoT devices and apps.
• We designed and built IOTWATCH1, a dynamic privacy anal-
ysis tool for IoT apps. IOTWATCH adds extra capabilities
to an IoT app’s source code to provide users with a privacy
interface and collect app data. The interface allows users
to easily specify their privacy preferences such as device
states and location. Also, it permits the monitoring of data
leaks and privacy behaviors in IoT apps at runtime. Lastly,
IOTWATCH informs the users when an app’s leak matches
with the privacy preference of a user.
• We analyzed 540 current IoT apps during the implemen-
tation and evaluation of IOTWATCH. First, we trained IOT-
WATCH with 380 apps. Then we evaluated its accuracy
on the remaining 160 IoT apps (120 market and 40 mali-
cious IoT apps). IOTWATCH classifies 146 IoT strings that
are sent out of the apps into privacy labels with 94.25%
accuracy. Additionally, it successfully flags 62 sensitive
leakages (29 via messaging and 33 via Internet communi-
cation) to unauthorized parties in 35 IoT apps. IOTWATCH
detects sensitive data leaks without significant overhead,
introducing on average 105 ms latency to an app’s execu-
tion.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we summarize the results of our IoT privacy
survey. In Section 3, we articulate the problem through a use
case and present the threat model. In Sections 4 and 5, we
introduce IOTWATCH’s architecture and its main components.
Implementation details of IOTWATCH are given in Section 6.
Further, we evaluate IOTWATCH in Section 7 and, in Section
8, we present some discussions. Lastly, we discuss the related
work in Section 9, and Section 10 concludes the paper.
1We made the IOTWATCH freely available to the community at
https://iotwatch.appspot.com/
2 IoT Privacy Survey
We conducted an IoT privacy survey to understand the privacy
concerns of IoT users when they use various IoT devices
and apps. Although the survey is not the major focus of this
work, it provides rich insights into the users experiences and
expectations on control over IoT app permissions, IoT privacy
nudges, and their interplay. The entire survey was authorized
by the institutional ethics review board (IRB) and occurred
between April 2019 and May 2019.
Privacy Survey Goals. We aim to answer the following ques-
tions: (1) what are the privacy concerns of IoT users?, (2) is
there a need for privacy analysis tools designed for IoT?, and
(3) what are the user expectations, in terms of usability re-
quirements, for privacy analysis tools?
We created 26 different questions organized into three cat-
egories. These categories align with three specific privacy
survey goals: (1) the characterization of the participants, (2)
privacy concerns of IoT users, and (3) the need for IoT privacy
analysis tools and their usability requirements. We provide
the details of the questions in Appendix A) and present the
profiles of participants and our key findings below.
Survey Overview and Recruitment. We made the survey
available to participants for four weeks. The users could ac-
cess the survey and submit their responses via an online ques-
tionnaire hosted on Google Forms [21]. The questionnaire in-
cluded single choice questions (e.g., yes, no), multiple-choice
questions, and free-form questions (detailed in Appendix A).
We made all the questions required except for the ones re-
questing an additional explanation from users in the form of
free-text input. Finally, we recruited the participants using
recruitment emails sent to lists of students, faculty, and staff
in our institutions. The emails included a brief explanation
about the survey and link to the online form.
Participant Characteristics. We recruited 123 participants
of which 69 participants (56.1%) were in the range of 18-25
years old and 37 (30.1%) were in the range of 26-35 years.
The remaining 17 (13.8%) participants were 36 years or older.
The majority of the participants (110 (89%)) had at least
completed some bachelor-level courses and 37 (30%) were
enrolled in graduate-level courses. A total of 112 (91.05%)
users shared that they currently use or are planning to use
IoT devices in their homes. Finally, 19 (15.4%) participants
knew how to develop their own IoT apps while 82 (66.7%)
participants had previous experience installing apps from an
IoT market or via using the source code of IoT apps available
online.
Ethics and Analysis. The human subjects review board of
our institutions approved the privacy survey. The participants
had to be over 18 years old to participate. The survey did
not collect any personal information from participants, other
than an institutional email address that was requested for com-
pensation purposes. We did not allow participants to submit
multiple responses, but they had the chance to change their
answers anytime before the survey closing date. We processed
and accepted all the responses obtained from the participants.
Further, we directly quantified the responses from single- and
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Expectations of survey’s participants % Agreement
Real-time privacy analysis 91.6%
Configurable privacy preferences 87.5%
Control over unauthorized data disclosure 86.6%
On-demand privacy controls 81.6%
Timely privacy notifications 85.3%
Inter-rater Reliability 86.5%
Table 1: Participant responses when asked about their expecta-
tions from a privacy analysis tool, which guided the design of
IOTWATCH. The percentage of agreement among the survey’s
participants showed a strong inter-rater reliability.
multiple-choice questions. Finally, we used two independent
researchers to analyze the free-from responses and did not
consider any answers flagged as potential outliers.
Compensation. After the survey’s closing date, every par-
ticipant was compensated either with extra-credit in their
coursework or a gift card with a monetary value. The student
participants could opt for receiving extra credit or monetary
compensation. Faculty and staff all received gift cards.
2.1 Survey Results
Privacy Concerns of IoT Users. The participants were con-
cerned about their private information being inadvertently
leaked to unauthorized parties. Specifically, 65 (52.8%) partic-
ipants felt uncomfortable about their personal data (e.g., their
password to login into edge devices), their behavior and habits
(e.g., when they go to sleep), location (e.g., whether they are
home or away), device’s settings (e.g., heating value of a ther-
mostat) and time configuration (e.g., when kids leave home),
and device states (e.g., whether the door is locked or not)
being handled by IoT systems. Also, at least 89 (72.4%) par-
ticipants expressed to be aware of IoT apps collecting their
sensitive information and sending it to remote servers for
data analytics such as profiling their energy usage and for
advertisement purposes [2]. Finally, 103 (83.7%) participants
expressed privacy concerns on the use of IoT systems, and 88
(71.5%) mentioned having heard about privacy issues in IoT
systems from the news or other media.
The Need for Real-time Privacy Tools. In total, 112 (91.1%)
participants raised broad concerns about lack of an existing
tool that informs the user regarding potential privacy risks
of IoT systems in real-time. Also, 119 (96.74%) participants
found the idea of using a tool to uncover privacy risks in
IoT highly plausible. Our participants were willing to use
automatic tools that modify (i.e., instrument) original IoT
apps to enable privacy analysis in real-time. Out of the 123
participants, 119 (96.74%) expressed their support to this
option if the tool is verified by the IoT platform.
User’s Expectations. To understand the characteristics of
an easy-to-use privacy tool, we asked participants a set of
questions to evaluate their usability expectations. Table 1
summarizes the participants’ responses. Here, we detail the
percentage of agreement among users for every privacy fea-
ture and the inter-rate reliability score. Finally, we evaluated
the participants’ approval of four different privacy labels uti-
lized to classify information accessed by IoT apps. The term
“Device-info” was considered appropriate to define informa-
tion from devices (e.g., device states or device type) by 109
(88.6%) participants, while the label “User-behavior” received
103 (83.7%) positive responses to define information related
to the user (e.g., what the user does, how the user configure
his/her IoT system). Furthermore, the label “Location” was
approved by 110 (89.4%) participants to define information
related to the location of devices and users. Lastly, the label
“Date-time” was approved in 100 (81.3%) responses to define
timing-related information.
2.2 Summary of Findings
Our findings shed new light on the need for cooperative pri-
vacy management practices between users and IoT markets,
which mitigate privacy risks based on user privacy prefer-
ences. Table 1 presents the needs of the users that align with
their control over their privacy preferences. We obtained an
inter-rate reliability of 86.5%, which can be considered strong.
Here, we summarize the privacy features that guides design
and development of IOTWATCH considering participants re-
sponses.
Real-time Privacy Analysis. The participants reflected their
opinion about being aware of apps privacy behavior in what
information leaves an IoT system and where it is transmitted.
Additionally, they reported that they expect to have minimal
configuration when new devices are dynamically plugged into
their IoT systems and new IoT apps are installed.
Configurable Privacy Preferences. The participants men-
tioned that fears about lack of privacy preference controls
limit their willingness to use IoT devices. For instance, they
prefer to have categories that define a high-level category that
shows the information-type leaving the IoT system, such as
“the door is locked” associated with a specific privacy label
and ”the mode is changed to sleep“ with another label.
Unauthorized Data Disclosure. The participants like having
better control over the disclosure of any private information.
For instance, they prefer to be notified when IoT systems
share their data with other parties. Additionally, participants
mentioned strategies that notify unencrypted Internet requests
or hard-coded messaging recipients, which mitigates the con-
sequences of privacy violations.
On-demand Privacy Controls and Privacy Notifications. The
majority of the participants acknowledged the effectiveness
of configurable privacy preferences over the IoT apps. They
mentioned these configurations help them have a better ex-
perience with a few numbers of notifications and minimal
runtime delay.
3 Problem Statement and Threat Model
Problem Statement. We use an example source code ab-
stracted from a smart-lock-control app (Figure 1) to illus-
trate the privacy concerns and behaviors in IoT apps. The
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1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
// smart-lock-control app: “controls the smart lock”
// Permissions Block
Device: smart_lock sl, presence pr
User-defined inputs: phone
// Events Subscription
subscribe(pr, “present”, f1)
subscribe(pr, “not present”, f2)
//Events Handler
f1(){…}
f2(){ sl.lock()
notifyUser(sl.state, phone)
leakInfo()}
// Sends notification to the user
notifyUser(state, number){
sendSMS(“Your lock is: ” + state, phone)
POST(“http://support.com”, sl.getLocation())
// Leaks sensitive data to attacker
leakInfo(){
sendSMS(“Nobody is Home”, 123-456-7890)}
3
2
1
4
Figure 1: An example IoT app leaking sensitive data to a
hard-coded phone number and performing insecure HTTP
calls.
expected behavior of the app is to lock the door and notify to
user-defined contacts that the door is locked when the user
leaves the house. At install-time, the user grants permissions
to the smart lock, presence sensor, and enters a phone number
for messaging notifications ( 1 ). The app subscribes to two
event handlers f1 and f2 to implement the app functionality.
The event handlers are invoked based on the presence sen-
sor’s state (user-present and user-not-present) ( 2 ). When the
user leaves home, “not-present” event handler (i.e., f2) locks
the door, sends a message notification, and transmits out the
door lock state to a remote server (i.e., http://support.com)
( 3 ). However, the actual behavior of the app adds a piece
of code that invokes a function (i.e., leakinfo()) sending
a string that contains “Nobody is Home” to a hard-coded
phone number ( 4 ). This string is highly private and informs
an adversary that the house is empty. This information can be
abused, for instance, to facilitate a burglar to break into the
house. This example shows that a user does not have control
over what an IoT app does with the sensitive data, who sees
it, and what they do with it. Unfortunately, IoT development
platforms do not provide users with sufficient information to
make informed decisions about their privacy preferences in
IoT environments.
Limitation of Existing Privacy Tools. There exist systems
to identify sensitive data-flows in IoT apps. For instance,
SAINT is a static system that uses taint analysis to identify sen-
sitive data-flows in IoT apps [10]. FlowFence, a dynamic sys-
tem, uses quarantined modules to enforce data-flow policies
on the use of sensitive data [18]. However, these approaches
are limited in precision and the number of privacy policies
enforced. For instance, SAINT and FlowFence have no way
of knowing if an app leaks sensitive data through developer-
or user-defined strings. For instance, the string “Nobody is
home” leaked through leakinfo()). Meanwhile, our analysis
of 540 IoT market apps showed that 64% of apps potentially
leak sensitive data through strings that do not include any
tainted data, yet the string is sensitive. Lastly, static systems
like SAINT, iRuler [51], and privacy tools for trigger-action
platforms [25] fail to detect sensitive data leaks from methods
defined dynamically in IoT apps [29]. Additionally, there are
no approaches that allow users to examine their sharing and
privacy preferences over individual IoT apps. For instance, a
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
// iotwatch-enabled smart-lock-control app
Description: “controls the smart lock”
// Permissions Block
Device: smart_lock sl, presence pr
User-defined inputs: phone
// Event Subscription
subscribe(pr, “present”, f1)
subscribe(pr, “not present”, f2)
//Event Handler
f1(){…}
f2(){ sl.lock()
notifyUser(sl.state, phone)
leakInfo()}
// Send notification to the user
notifyUser(state, number){
sendSMS(“Your lock is: ” + state, phone)
sendPush(“App is using data of type:”
classification)}
// Leak sensitive data to attacker
leakInfo(){
sendSMS(“Nobody is Home”, 123-456-7890)
sendPush(“Privacy Risk of type:” context 
“with data of type:” classification)}
C1
C2
C4
C3
C5
Figure 2: An example of an IoT app instrumented by IOT-
WATCH to support the notification interface.
user may desire to share her energy usage data with a third
party in a specific IoT app yet she wants to restrict sharing all
other sensitive information with third-parties. This requires a
personalized privacy setting for each app that gives control to
the users over what to share.
In contrast to previous approaches, IOTWATCH analyzes
data-flows at runtime; thus, the flow’s content is analyzed
to determine whether a data-flow constitutes a privacy con-
cern or not. Such a runtime analysis capability overcomes the
limitations of static analysis tools that fail to consider taint
variables generated dynamically. Additionally, IOTWATCH
provides additional user interfaces that allow users to config-
ure their privacy settings for each app and informs the users
about its findings. We provide a detailed comparison of IOT-
WATCH with other privacy tools for IoT and Android apps in
Section 9.
Threat Model and Assumptions. We consider sensitive data
leaks in IoT apps through malicious apps or unintentional de-
veloper mistakes. We consider sensitive information leaks in
IoT apps via messaging and Internet connections, apps that
transmit data to the recipients that are not authorized by users,
or apps that transmit sensitive data without proper data pro-
tection mechanisms implemented. We do not consider safety
and security violations in IoT apps [12, 13]. Additionally, we
do not track data-flows via push notifications or sink func-
tions that are authorized by OAuth (e.g., a user authorizes a
third-party service through OAuth protocol to share the device
states for data visualization).
4 Approach Overview
IOTWATCH, a runtime privacy analysis system, collects the
information exchanged with external parties in IoT apps to
uncover privacy risks. The collected information is used to
classify sensitive data into easy-to-understand privacy labels.
The findings are checked against users’ privacy preferences
and users are notified if there is a mismatch. IOTWATCH helps
users define their privacy preferences and have better control
over their sensitive data and maintain better privacy practices.
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Install Time 
(Section 5.1) 
IoT 
Corpus
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Privacy 
Notifications
Runtime App
Execution
IOTWATCH Analyzer
(NLP-based IoT String Classification, String 
Recipient Analysis)
Runtime
(Sections 5.2 & 5.3) 
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(IOTWATCH-enabled App)
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IoT App
Source Code
1  def var
2  def fo
3  myDevice (fo)
4  ... 
10  leakinfo (fo, var)
11  http (myURL)
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(Section 5.1) 
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IoT App
IOTWATCH API
user-defined info
sink-call info
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privacy analysis
Figure 3: Overview of IOTWATCH architecture. Three main stages are highlighted: first, IoT apps are modified at instrumentation
time to enable IOTWATCH; second, the user selects their privacy preference at install time; finally, at runtime, IOTWATCH analyzes
the IoT app data to uncover privacy risks and behaviors.
4.1 Understanding Leakage in IoT Apps
We use the smart-lock-control app depicted in Figure 1
to illustrate the logical steps of IOTWATCH (Figure 2). The
instrumentor first adds extra logic to the app’s source code to
implement a user interface (UI). The UI allows a user to select
a set of privacy labels and the type of potential leakage mech-
anisms to be tracked by IOTWATCH. We provide users with
four privacy labels: location, user-behavior, device-info, and
date-time, and two potential leakage mechanisms: messaging
and Internet, to define their privacy profile. Additionally, the
code instrumentor adds extra logic to send app data to IOT-
WATCH server at runtime. The data includes user-defined input
variables (i.e., phone) ( C1 ) and the content and recipients of
the functions used to send data out of the app. The sample
code in the smart-lock-control app includes two messag-
ing functions ( C2 and C4 ). IOTWATCH instruments both the
messaging functions to collect their content (i.e., “Your lock
is: ” + state, and “Nobody is Home”) and their recipients (i.e.,
phone and 123-456-7890). Lastly, the instrumentor inserts
extra code to enable the notification of IOTWATCH’s results to
users ( C3 and C5 ).
At install-time, a user configures two pieces of privacy set-
tings for the app based on her privacy preferences: (1) the
privacy labels that are of interest of the user and (2) the types
of possible leakage methods to be tracked by IOTWATCH.
These privacy settings define the user’s privacy profile and are
used to notify the user when her sensitive data is transmitted
out of an app. The user then installs the instrumented app,
which transmits its data to the IOTWATCH server once a speci-
fied data-flow is flagged. This information enables IOTWATCH
to identify the type of sensitive information that the IoT app
used and to analyze the information obtained from the app to
uncover privacy data leaks and potential privacy behaviors.
IOTWATCH implements a novel algorithm to verify whether
the sensitive data is sent to recipients defined by the user
via matching the user-defined inputs to the data recipients.
For instance, for the first potential leakage ( C2 ), the data is
sent to a user-defined phone number ( C1 ). For the second
possible leakage ( C4 ), the data is sent to a hard-coded phone
number, which might indicate a privacy violation to the user.
Also, by analyzing the content of these potential leakages
with NLP-based techniques, IOTWATCH verifies that the app
uses sensitive information regarding the devices (i.e., “Your
lock is:”) and location (i.e., “Nobody is Home”). Lastly, IOT-
WATCH informs the user of its findings and generates privacy
awareness. For the first possible leakage, IOTWATCH sends a
push notification with the privacy labels of the information in-
cluded in the message ( C3 ). For the second potential leakage,
IOTWATCH informs the privacy content of the message and
also alerts the user regarding the potential privacy violations
of the user’s privacy ( C5 ).
4.2 Terminology Used
We define some of the terms used to explain IOTWATCH’s
architecture.
Sink-calls. IoT programming platforms define specific APIs
to send information out of the apps (i.e., sink-calls) [34, 48]
as external data-flows. In this work, we focus on sink-calls of
type messaging and Internet. Sink-call methods require two
types of information: the recipient and the content. Specifi-
cally, the recipients define where the information contained
in the sink-call is being sent to, and the content defines the
message or data sent in the form of IoT strings.
Privacy Labels. We define four different privacy labels (i.e.,
date-time, device-info, location, and user-behavior) to classify
IoT strings (i.e., sink-call content) in IoT apps that users
can specify. These privacy labels were selected based on the
findings and takeaways extracted from a privacy survey as
noted in Section 2.
Privacy Profile. We consider the collection of privacy labels
and notification preferences defined by the IOTWATCH’s user
as a privacy profile. At install-time, the user selects the pre-
ferred type of privacy information and communication meth-
ods (e.g., messaging, Internet) to be tracked by IOTWATCH.
Privacy Leakage. We consider any data that is sent to an
external recipient that is not authorized (i.e., defined by the
user at install-time) or acknowledged (i.e., informed to the
user via the app’s description block) by the user of the IoT
app as a leakage.
Privacy Behavior. We consider any sink-call that sends data
to an authorized recipient, but that potentially puts the sensi-
tive information at risk as a privacy behavior. For instance,
Internet communications sending the information to legiti-
mate servers in plain text.
5
5 IOTWATCH
Figure 3 illustrates IOTWATCH’s architecture which includes
processes performed in three main phases: instrumentation
time, install time, and runtime. At instrumentation time, the
code instrumentor adds extra logic to the app’s source code (1)
to implement a privacy interface (Section 5.1.1) where users
specify their privacy preferences, and (2) to collect app infor-
mation required for IOTWATCH analysis. At install time, the
user defines the type of privacy information they desire to be
tracked and notified about by IOTWATCH. Finally, at runtime,
the app sends its information to IOTWATCH server, which
classifies the collected data into privacy labels through NLP
techniques (Section 5.2.1). In addition, IOTWATCH performs
analysis on the data recipients (Section 5.2.2) for potential
privacy leakages. In the case of sink-calls of type messaging,
it matches their recipients to user-defined inputs to check if
the apps send sensitive information to unauthorized parties. In
the case of Internet communications, it checks whether an app
sends information to the remote servers using unencrypted
HTTP calls. IOTWATCH’s classification process is supported
by a model implemented from a market IoT corpus. Lastly,
IOTWATCH informs the user about its findings (Section 5.3).
5.1 Code Instrumentor
IOTWATCH’s code instrumentor analyzes the source code of an
original IoT app to build an intermediate representation (IR).
The IR allows one to extract the sensor-computation-actuator
paradigm of IoT apps [10, 12]. The use of an IR enables
the design of generic solutions that can be implemented for
different IoT programming platforms (e.g., Smasung Smart-
Things and OpenHAB) [10]. Then, the instrumentor extracts
the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the app and implements
custom node visitors to build the Inter-procedural Control
Graph (ICFG). The ICFG is used to flag user-defined inputs
in the permission block of the app, and the recipients and con-
tent of the sink-call functions (i.e., messaging and Internet).
Then, the instrumentor adds extra code to collect and trans-
mits this data to the IOTWATCH’s server, and to implement
push notifications that informs the user about IOTWATCH’s
findings in real-time. The code instrumentor groups collected
data into two different categories: (1) app information and (2)
sink-call information. We detail each of them as follows:
App Information. IOTWATCH’s code instrumentor visits the
permission block (Figure 2) in IoT apps and extracts informa-
tion defined by the user. Specifically, it collects user-defined
inputs required to implement the sink-calls (e.g., phone num-
bers to receive notifications from the app). As we detail in
Section 5.2, this data is matched with the information directly
extracted from sink-calls (i.e., recipients) to detect, for in-
stance, data sent to unauthorized recipients (i.e., not defined
by the user), which may lead to potential privacy issues for
the user.
Sink-Call Information. It includes the content and recipi-
ents of messaging and Internet communications. For instance,
in the app’s source code depicted in Figure 2, IOTWATCH
smart-lock-control
12:01
< Back Save
Select Smart Lock:
Which?
Lock1
>
Enter Security Code:
Phone Number
111-111-1111
>
Notifications:
Number
12345
>
Set mode(s):
(a) Original IoT app
smart-lock-control
12:01
< Back Save
IOTWATCH Privacy Labels:
Notification Options:
Date-time Information
Device Information
Location Information
User Behavior
Notify Messaging Communications
Notify Internet Communications
1
2
(b) Instrumented IoT app
Figure 4: (a) Install-time interface of an IoT app and (b) Instru-
mented IoT app interface: IOTWATCH interface enables users
(1) to select privacy labels and (2) to identify unauthorized
recipients when a sensitive information is leaked.
extracts the content “Your lock is: + state” from the first
messaging function in Line 16, and the content “Nobody is
Home” from the second messaging function in Line 21. As
per the recipients, it extracts the recipient’s value contained
in the variable phone from the first messaging method (Line
16) and the hard-coded phone number “123-456-7890” from
the second messaging function (Line 21). IOTWATCH uses
the content of the sink-calls to make the user aware of the
type of sensitive information that IoT apps handle. We use
an NLP-based model to analyze the content of external data-
flows and classify them into four privacy labels that are easy
to understand by the user. Also, it uses the recipient informa-
tion in IOTWATCH analyzer to uncover sensitive data leaks.
Our tool matches the recipient information extracted from
messaging and Internet communications with both the user-
defined and user-acknowledged information at install-time.
The user-defined information is entered by the user (Line 5)
and the user-acknowledged information is informed by the de-
veloper via the app’s description block (Line 2) and approved
by the user. In cases where the sink-call (i.e., messaging or
Internet) is executed using unauthorized recipients, the flow
is flagged as leak, and the user is informed. With this analysis,
IOTWATCH creates awareness of sensitive information being
disclosed to unauthorized or malicious recipients. Besides, for
Internet communications, we verify that the recipient supports
data encryption. With this, our tool guarantees that the sensi-
tive information is protected from potential eavesdroppers.
5.1.1 Selective Instrumentation
In addition to collecting app information, IOTWATCH per-
forms a selective code instrumentation to support on-demand
privacy analysis/notifications and to facilitate the analysis of
encrypted IoT strings.
Privacy User Interface. The instrumentor adds additional
code to implement a UI and create a privacy profile of the
user. Figure 4(a) shows the original user interface of an IoT
app presented to the user during install-time, and Figure 4(b)
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2:
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4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
//Encryption to obfuscate sink-call content
def crypto = new Crypter()
def plainText = “Let’s leak this message"
def secret = “123456789“
//Selective Instrumentation before encryption
IoTWatch.collect(plaintext)
def encryptedText = crypto.encrypt(plainText, secret)
leakInfo(encryptedText)
// Send notification to the user
notifyUser(state, number){
sendSMS(“Your lock is: ” + state, phone)
sendPush(“App is using data of type:”
classification)}
// Leak sensitive data to attacker
leakInfo(encryptedText){
sendSMS(encryptedText, 123-456-7890)
sendPush(“Privacy Risk of type:” context 
“with data of type:” classification)}
1 2
3
Figure 5: Sample IoT app that encrypts the sensitive data to be
leaked in an attempt to bypass the NLP analysis of IOTWATCH.
The selective instrumentation capabilities of IOTWATCH per-
mits the analysis of the data before it is encrypted.
illustrates the selective code instrumentation options of the
IOTWATCH-enabled app. IOTWATCH’s instrumentor does not
impact the UI experience of the IoT app at runtime, but of-
fers new privacy features at install-time not available in the
original app. The instrumented app offers the user the pos-
sibility to create a privacy profile and receive notifications
regarding specific privacy labels that are of interest to the user
( 1 ). Also, it allows for selecting which privacy concerns (e.g.,
option to notify leaks from messaging or Internet communi-
cations) must be analyzed and informed by IOTWATCH ( 2 ).
Such a design supports the expectations of the IoT app users
with (1) configurable privacy preferences, (2) on-demand pri-
vacy controls, and (3) timely privacy notifications (Table 1)
as were summarized in Section 2. Finally, since we target
open-source IoT platforms, the use of selective instrumenta-
tion does not change or impact the original user interface of
the app that may be considered as intellectual property. For
closed-source platforms, we envision developers using the
features offered in IOTWATCH to evaluate and improve the
protection of sensitive information and the privacy of users.
IOTWATCH vs. Encryption. The use of encryption to hide
the content of a sink-call may limit the effectiveness of NLP
techniques. For instance, NLP models created from plain-text
data would fail to classify encrypted strings. However, selec-
tive instrumentation may facilitate the analysis of IoT apps
that codify or encrypt the data that is sent out to hide their in-
tent. In general, IoT programming platform only permits lim-
ited (i.e., white-listed) number of libraries to implement the
app’s execution [43]. In popular IoT platforms like Samsung
SmartThings, this group of white-listed APIs does not include
a single class that implements encryption. Also, as a general
rule, IoT platforms reject obfuscated apps when developers
submit them for approval during the vetting process. However,
there still several reasons to allow encryption-handling in IOT-
WATCH. First, malicious apps may skip the vetting process of
IoT programming platforms and while still be in the app mar-
ket. Second, encryption handling allows for a privacy tool that
is not only exclusive to specific IoT platforms, but that can be
generalized as broader solution. As explained before, the use
of a limited (i.e., white-listed) number of libraries to code the
IoT apps facilitates the detection of encryption functions by
IOTWATCH. Figure 5 shows a sample IoT app that implements
encryption to hide its intentions of leaking a sensitive string
via messaging. The method crypto.encrypt is known to be
approved to implement encryption. IOTWATCH’s selective in-
strumentation extracts the call graph of the app and detects
the presence of a function implementing encryption ( 2 ) on
a tained variable plainText. The result of the encryption is
stored in a new taint variable encryptedText, which is later
leaked via messaging ( 3 ). To solve this challenge, the instru-
mentor tracks the flow’s path of the encrypted variable and
inserts extra code to collect its content before it is encrypted
( 1 ).
During our analysis, out of 540 current market and mali-
cious IoT apps, we did not find a single case of an app encrypt-
ing the content while using messaging. However, we found
several cases of encryption in Internet communications. IOT-
WATCH’s instrumentor bypasses encryption on the content of
the Internet calls by analyzing the entire data-flow path within
the apps (i.e., from the data source to the sink functions), and
by collecting the information related to the sink-call content
before it is encrypted or codified. In the specific case of en-
crypted Internet communications, the instrumentor flags the
call graph nodes containing the https call methods and adds
additional code to collect its content before the encryption
call is executed.
5.2 IOTWATCH Analyzer
IOTWATCH uses NLP techniques to analyze and classify an
app’s sink-call contents to four privacy labels. Additionally,
it flags messaging and Internet communications that disclose
sensitive information to unauthorized recipients. Finally, it
uncovers privacy concerns from apps that do not protect the
sensitive information from passive observers. Figure 3 illus-
trates the logical steps of the IOTWATCH’s analyzer at runtime,
that includes: (1) classification of sink-call content through
NLP techniques, (2) privacy analysis of recipients of sensi-
tive information, and (3) building a user privacy notification
interface to inform the user about IOTWATCH’s findings.
5.2.1 Classification of Sink-Call Content
The content of messaging and Internet communications in IoT
apps may include sensitive information from taint variables or
might be just string messages with privacy implications to the
user. As noted earlier, the sink-call content classification of
IOTWATCH takes the content of messaging and Internet com-
munications as input and assigns it to privacy labels returned
as the output. For instance, if the sink-call contains the string
message “the door is unlocked”, the classifier performs se-
mantic analysis on the string and classifies it as “Device-info”.
The conversion of IoT strings into privacy labels helps the
user to understand how IoT apps use sensitive information so
they can make informed privacy decisions. Below, we present
how to construct a training set for classification from a corpus
of IoT apps.
Constructing Privacy Labels. IOTWATCH classifies IoT app
sink-call contents into a set of privacy labels. The use of pri-
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vacy labels provide three main advantages. First, they allow
users to understand what type of data the apps leak. For in-
stance, a string that contains “The mode has been changed
to Home” can be presented to users as leaking location. Sec-
ond, the privacy labels permit users to have control over their
privacy preferences. For instance, a user may desire to al-
low an app to transmit energy usage of a thermostat to a
remote server, yet she restricts other types of privacy-related
information. Third, the privacy labels enable an on-demand
notification system that guarantees an improved user experi-
ence with less disruptive and more intuitive notifications, and
minimal runtime delay added to the app’s execution time.
We define four privacy labels through the analysis of the
semantics of strings extracted from messaging and Internet
communications in IoT apps (although adding more privacy
labels later is a straightforward task). The privacy labels are
based on user feedback that we acquired via a privacy survey
(Section 2). Also, to adequately protect the user’s privacy,
some strings may require the use of more than one privacy
label to guarantee completeness on the classification. For in-
stance, the message string “The door will remain open for
another 5 minutes” supports multi-labeling of types Device-
info and Date-time. Similarly, “Garage door is not opening
since the car was not present at Home, less than 15 sec ago”,
would be labeled as Device-info (the door is not opening so it
is still closed), Location (the car was not present at Home),
and Date-time (15 sec ago). Some examples of IoT sink-call
contents assigned to the various privacy labels are presented in
Table 2. In general, the use of multiple privacy labels to a sin-
gle text considers more complex semantics structures of string
and reveals more privacy-sensitive information contained in
the leaked message. As we explain later in this section, we
successfully use NLP to achieve this goal. We present the
four privacy categories used to classify IoT strings:
• Date-time: defines an app text that contain time or date
information. For instance, a messaging call that sends the
string “door is unlocked at 5:00 pm" contains time informa-
tion that specifies the time that the door would be unlocked.
We found that many IoT apps contain date-time informa-
tion for reporting the state of a device at any given time.
• Device-info: defines the text that contain the states of de-
vices and also device information (i.e., device type, model,
manufacturer). For instance, an Internet call that contains
“energy usage” transmits out the power state of a thermostat.
We assign all strings that contain information from devices
with a device-info label to inform the users about potential
privacy violations.
• Location: defines the text that reveal physical and geo-
location location of users and devices. For instance, the
string “kids have arrived home” contains physical location
information, and “the patio door is unlocked” contains the
geo-location of a house.
• User-behavior: defines the text that provides information
about user preferences. We found that many IoT apps leak
strings in messaging calls about app configuration and user
App Sink-Call Content Assigned Privacy Labels
Thermostat is turned on. device-info
The door will remain open for another
5 minutes.
device-info,
date-time
Door is not opening since car was not
present at Home, less than 15 sec ago.
device-info,
location,
date-time
Sleep time set for you as requested. user-behavior
Table 2: Examples of leaked strings extracted from IoT apps
and their assigned privacy labels. Observe that IOTWATCH is
capable of assigning multiple privacy labels to specific strings
with more complex semantics.
activities. For instance, an app includes a string, “the user
mode changed to vacation from home”.
IoT App Corpus. Our study of sink-call contents (i.e., IoT
strings) from 540 real IoT apps showed that they pose a few
unique characteristics compared to data-flows from other do-
mains. First, the size of the texts extracted is usually three to
four shingles on average, yet it contains highly private data
(e.g., “the door is unlocked”). Second, their linguistic struc-
ture is minimal regarding semantics (e.g., “mode changed to
away”) compared to other short documents extracted from
popular general-knowledge corpora [20, 31, 53]. Third, their
meanings usually are closely attached to the app’s context
(e.g., “if the user is not-present, turn off the light”). Based
on these facts, we designed an NLP model that can be effec-
tive for classifying semantic-deficient, but information-rich
texts. To understand whether leaked strings includes sensitive
information and assign them a privacy label, we first imple-
mented a classification model using publicly available data
corpora [20, 31, 53]; however, due to the specific characteris-
tics of IoT texts, we obtained very low classification accuracy
(more details in Appendix D.1). To improve these initial re-
sults, we constructed an IoT-specific corpus for classification
purposes that successfully considers and solves the challenges
above. To do so, we first collected the content of messaging
and Internet calls from current IoT market apps. We pre-
processed the resulting dataset by filtering out punctuation
and stop words. Further, we manually labeled the IoT strings
to the four privacy labels. Here, we applied multi-labeling
to contents that contained information related to more than
one privacy label. We detail constructing the IoT corpus in
Section 6.
NLP Model Construction. We implemented an NLP model
that uses a specific IoT corpus for training purposes. Then,
we used the model to classify unknown sink-call contents
to privacy labels. To train the model, we used a supervised
learning approach that required labeled data as input. We
found that the supervised approach yields better results than
other approaches such as keyword-search. This is because
often, the IoT string does not include enough information
to assign the labels through simple keyword-search-based
analysis. For instance, keyword-search would fail to identify
the user-behavior in a messaging communication that leaks
a string “the kids left home”. Moreover, we used skip-gram
and doc2vec [8] to represent every IoT corpus text into a
multi-dimensional vector. We use doc2vec over other known
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approaches like bag-of-words (BoW) [28] as it considers the
entire structure of the text to perform syntax analysis (i.e.,
multi-word expression analysis) [30]. We then performed
topic classification of the IoT strings using an automated
machine learning approach [6]. Note that the analysis of NLP
results from different classification algorithms is out of the
scope of this work. In fact, our automatic machine learning
approach selects the best classification algorithm depending
on the structure of text; thus, the best accuracy value is always
guaranteed in IOTWATCH. In Section 6, we provide details of
the NLP implementation, including the IoT corpus used to
train the model.
5.2.2 Sink-Call Recipient Analysis
IOTWATCH performs sink-call recipient analysis via messag-
ing by matching recipients of the data with information de-
fined by the user at install-time. For instance, in Figure 1,
the user defines an authorized recipient in the variable phone.
IOTWATCH extracts this information and correlates it with the
app data extracted at runtime. In this specific example, two
outcomes are possible. In Line 15, a messaging function is
executed using phone as the recipient. Since IOTWATCH rec-
ognizes that the user previously authorized this recipient, the
flow does not represent a leakage. However, a second messag-
ing function is executed in Line 19. In this case, IOTWATCH
sees discrepancies between the recipient used (i.e., 123-456-
7890) and the one that was defined by the user, and flags it
as a leakage. Also, the analyzer checks the capabilities of the
recipients of Internet communications to support encryption
and adequately protects the sensitive information from, for
instance, eavesdroppers. Back to our example, in Figure 1, an
Internet communication is executed in Line 16. IOTWATCH
extracts the recipient used (i.e., URL) and observes that the
remote server is being accessed via Hyper Text Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP), so the information is sent out of the app in plain
text. This constitutes a privacy behavior that could expose
the content of the Internet message to passive observers (i.e.,
eavesdroppers). In this case, IOTWATCH flags this flow as a
potential privacy concern for the user.
5.3 Response to App Data Leaks
Our privacy survey (Section 2) shows that users of IoT apps
desire on-demand privacy analysis and notifications. Based
on this feedback, IOTWATCH implements two different pri-
vacy notification options (Figure 6). First, it allows a user to
select specific privacy labels (one, multiple, or all) to create
a privacy profile and receive notifications. For instance, if
the user is only concerned about the use of data related to
location information, she may select the location label so that
IOTWATCH informs if a sink-call content contains informa-
tion related to her and the devices’ location. In this case, the
user would not receive notifications regarding the use of other
types of sensitive information within the IoT app. Second,
IOTWATCH allows the user to decide if she desires to be no-
tified regarding messaging, Internet calls, or both, whenever
smart-lock-control
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IOTWATCH Data Flow Labels:
Notification Options:
Date-time Information
Device Information
Location Information
User Behavior
Notify Messaging Communications
Notify Internet Communications 
IOTWATCH has detected data sent 
containing inf rmation related to 
your Location.
(a) User configuration
smart-lock-control
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< Back Save
IOTWATCH Data Flow Labels:
Notification Options:
Date-time Information
Device Information
Location Information
User Behavior
Notify Messaging Communications 
Notify Internet Communications 
Privacy Behavior: information related 
to your Device was sent unprotected 
to www.support.com
(b) Notification to users
Figure 6: IOTWATCH’s findings are informed to the users
through push notifications. The findings include (1) the pri-
vacy labels assigned to the sink-call content, and (2) the poten-
tial privacy concerns associated with the IoT communication.
they potentially leak data to unauthorized parties. The ap-
proach of implementing a selective user-specific notification
system provides flexible privacy options to the user, lowers
the latency overhead of IOTWATCH by reducing the number
of processed and classified IoT strings, and enhances the user
experience by reducing the number of notifications at runtime.
Finally, even though its flexible and very configurable nature,
IOTWATCH enables all the privacy labels and notifications
options by default. On the one hand, technically-enthusiastic
users that fully understand the privacy risks of IoT apps may
create their own privacy profiles by disabling install-time op-
tions in IOTWATCH, for a better user experience. On the other
hand, users that are not aware of the privacy implications of
sensitive information being leaked to third parties via IoT
apps, or that do not completely understand the privacy labels
in IOTWATCH, may rely on the default options.
5.4 IOTWATCH API
The analyzer collects app data to uncover data leaks and
privacy behaviors in IoT apps. We implemented a REST API
to enable effective data exchange and communication between
the instrumented IoT app and IOTWATCH’s analyzer running
in the cloud (Figure 3). From the app to the server, the API
constructs a JSON object with the user-defined recipients and
the sink-call information. From the server to the app, another
JSON is transmitted including the analysis results and the
notifications to the user (more details in Appendix E).
6 Implementation Details
We implemented IOTWATCH for IoT applications developed
for Samsung SMARTTHINGS, which is the IoT platform that has
the highest share of devices and applications in the current IoT
market [44, 49]. Samsung SMARTTHINGS apps are developed
in Groovy, a dynamic programming language that supports
static compilation. Static compilation permits for all methods
and classes in the apps to be annotated at compile time, which
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makes this information fully available to the instrumentation
portion of IOTWATCH.
Code Instrumentation. IOTWATCH traverses on the Ab-
stract Syntax Tree (AST) of the IoT app’s IR through
the ASTTransformation class and builds an app’s Intra-
procedural Control Flow Graph (ICFG) [10]. IOTWATCH in-
volves around 1700 lines of code written in Groovy to ana-
lyze the app source code, construct the IR, generate the ICFG,
and perform the code instrumentation. We implemented IOT-
WATCH’s instrumentor as a web application using Groovy
programming language (more details in Appendix C). We
made the instrumentor available online for the community.
Collection of IoT Corpus. To avoid overlapping between
the data used for training and evaluation of IOTWATCH, out
of 540 apps, we selected 380 current market apps crawled
from SMARTTHINGS repositories [45, 47] to build the IoT cor-
pus. The app population included apps from 6 different cate-
gories: Convenience, Smart Home Automation, Entertainment,
Personal Care, Security & Safety, and Smart Transportation.
From the selected apps for training, we extracted a total of
2014 different IoT strings. We then labeled these strings ac-
cording to the four privacy labels. Specifically, 46.8% of the
strings contained information related to the IoT devices, while
20.8% contained relevant information related to Date-time.
The remaining 19.2% and 13.2% of the IoT strings shared
information related to location and user-behavior, respectively.
Additionally, we allowed up to 75% of inter-labeling assign-
ment to the strings, meaning, up to three different privacy
labels can be assigned to a single string. In total, we applied
multi-labeling to 72% of the privacy strings in the IoT corpus.
Finally, we used 75% of the total corpus to train the classifier.
Then, we verified the obtained model with the remaining 25%
of the data. Initial testing results on the NLP model showed
an average precision of 94.3% and recall of 89.6%.
Classification of IoT Privacy Strings. We use Automatic
Machine Learning (Auto-ML) tools offered by Google App
Engine [6] to perform privacy classification of IoT strings.
Among its benefits, modern auto-ML approaches perform neu-
ral architecture search, enable hyper-parameter optimization,
and utilize advanced model architectures to classify contents
to privacy labels with high accuracy. More particularly, we im-
plemented a custom multi-class multi-label model using the
Natural Language API offered by Google (Google-NL) [7].
Google-NL offers a suite of ML algorithms that automati-
cally optimize the algorithm parameters based on the specific
algorithm utilized and the characteristics of the dataset to
guarantee the highest accuracy. Our initial analysis of 2014
IoT strings showed remarkable semantic similarities among
them; thus, the use of labeled data reduces the training time
considerably. Finally, we noticed that only two (0.5%) IoT
strings in the corpus were in an idiom different from En-
glish (Spanish in both cases). Thus, we implemented our NLP
solution to classify strings defined in English.
7 Evaluation
We evaluated IOTWATCH based on the three research ques-
tions (RQ) below:
RQ1 What is the effectiveness of IOTWATCH in correctly
classifying the IoT strings into privacy labels? (Section 7.1).
RQ2 What is the effectiveness of IOTWATCH in detecting
sensitive data leaks and potential privacy behaviors in IoT
apps? (Section 7.2).
RQ3 What is the runtime performance overhead of IOT-
WATCH in terms of latency and storage? (Section 7.3).
We used a total of 540 current IoT apps to implement and
evaluate IOTWATCH. Out of the total, 380 SMARTTHINGS apps
were used to build the IoT corpus and train the NLP model,
and the other 160 apps were used to evaluate its performance.
For comprehensiveness, we included in the evaluation phase
120 SMARTTHINGS market apps [45, 47], and 40 malicious
apps crawled from the IOTBENCH repository [26]. IOTBENCH
is an IoT-specific test corpus used to evaluate systems de-
signed for IoT app security and privacy. It includes flawed
apps that perform various malicious activities, including sen-
sitive data leaks via both messaging and Internet functions.
After instrumentation of the evaluation apps was completed,
we executed the instrumented apps in the SMARTTHINGS
IDE [46], which is a propriety simulation environment to
execute SMARTTHINGS apps. IOTWATCH’s instrumentor adds
25% more lines of code (LoC) to the apps on average, which
translates into adding 65 LoC to an IoT app that has an aver-
age size of 265 LoC. While being executed in SMARTTHINGS
IDE, the instrumented apps send their privacy data to IOT-
WATCH’s analyzer which runs on a Python web server hosted
on Google App Engine [19].
We evaluated IOTWATCH’s accuracy in classifying strings
extracted from IoT messaging and Internet communications
into users’ privacy preferences (i.e., privacy labels) (Sec-
tion 7.1). Also, we check its effectiveness in detecting sen-
sitive data leaks and flagging potential privacy behaviors in
IoT apps (Section 7.2). As noted earlier in Section 4.2, a leak
is defined as a piece of information that leaves an IoT app
without user consent. In IoT apps, the consent of a user is
either asked through an app description block or through ac-
knowledging the flow’s recipients at install-time. However,
we found that, out of 160 apps, only 121 (75.6%) define some
type of app’s description. Additionally, in most cases users
are not informed nor given the chance to assert the app’s in-
tent or the recipients of sensitive information. For instance, a
messaging function using a hard-coded recipient not entered
by a user, or an Internet communications that sends sensitive
data to a server that is not informed to the user via an app
description block is clearly a leak. Finally, we define privacy
behaviors that put the sensitive information at risk. For in-
stance, an Internet communication that sends data to a remote
server without using encryption.
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Figure 7: Evaluation results in the classification of IoT strings extracted from messaging and Internet communications to
user-friendly privacy labels: (a) accuracy, (b) recall, (c) precision, (d) specificity, and (e) the average value of all considered
performance metrics.
7.1 Performance of IoT String Classification
IOTWATCH’s analyzer classifies IoT app strings into four pri-
vacy labels. The classification results include the assigned
label and the confidence scores through a threshold th. If the
classification score is over the predefined threshold, the pri-
vacy label is assigned to the string. For instance, the string
“the front door at home is unlocked” resulted in classifica-
tion scores of device-info=0.94, user-behavior=0.03, loca-
tion=0.86, and date-time=0.3. By design, the classification
scores are independent of each other, that is, if th value is
set to 0.7, IOTWATCH classifies the string into privacy infor-
mation of type device-info and location. In total, IOTWATCH
classified 146 IoT strings extracted from 95 different IoT apps.
Out of these, 112 strings were extracted from messaging com-
munications; 54 messages from 44 market IoT apps and 58
messages from 30 malicious apps. The remaining 34 strings
were extracted from Internet communications; 12 Internet
calls extracted from 10 market IoT apps, and 22 extracted
from 11 malicious IoT apps.
Classification of Encrypted IoT Strings. As detailed in Sec-
tion 5.1.1, the selective instrumentation of IOTWATCH enables
NLP analysis on encrypted data. We study the effectiveness
of IOTWATCH in classifying IoT strings that have been previ-
ously encrypted. Out of 160 apps analyzed, we found seven
benign apps executing nine encrypted Internet communica-
tions. Similarly, we found 11 malicious apps executing 23
Internet communications with encrypted content. Despite the
use of encryption techniques, IOTWATCH effectively collected
and classified the information sent as encrypted strings in
100% of the cases. Finally, we did not find any IoT applica-
tion using encrypted messaging.
Accuracy by Threshold Values. We study how IOTWATCH’s
classifier performs for different threshold values th. The goal
of this analysis is to find the value th that leads to the high-
est performance overall. Figure 7 illustrates the accuracy,
recall, precision, and specificity of the NLP model. Overall,
IOTWATCH yields the best accuracy with the threshold val-
ues between 0.1 to 0.5. Figure 7(e) summarizes the average
metrics for different values of th. We observe that th = 0.4
yields the best classification results for all metrics. Finally,
IOTWATCH classifies IoT strings to correct privacy labels
with 94.25%, 85.17%, 95.01%, and 97.34% average accuracy,
recall, precision, and specificity, respectively. We detail the
impact of various threshold values to classification results in
Appendix G.
Accuracy by Privacy Label. We further study the sensitivity
of IOTWATCH’s classifier to each privacy label. The goal is
to determine the effectiveness of IOTWATCH in classifying
strings to the different privacy labels. IOTWATCH achieves
the highest accuracy for privacy labels of type location and
date-time. This is because date, time, and location can be
easily inferred from semantically-simple strings. Also, it is
very common to find information related to these privacy
labels embedded in the same string (e.g., “he arrived home
5 minutes ago”). In contrast, IOTWATCH obtained the lower
accuracy results for privacy labels of type user-behavior. This
is because user-behavior information is harder to infer from
simple strings. In spite of these results, IOTWATCH achieved
the lowest accuracy of 90.79% for user-behavior labels, which
is comparable with the best classification results of other
similar tools in the market [35] (more details in Appendix G).
Findings on Privacy Analysis of IoT Strings. IOTWATCH
classifies IoT strings to privacy labels with an average accu-
racy of 94.25%. Out of 160 apps, IOTWATCH identified 50
(31.25%) apps that transmit data related to device informa-
tion via messaging, and 20 (12.5%) apps that do the same via
Internet communications. Also, 11 (6.9%) apps handled data
related to date and time in messages and only one transmit
similar information using the Internet. IOTWATCH also iden-
tified 38 (23.75%) apps transmitting information related to
the user behavior in their messages and nine (5.6%) including
similar type of information in Internet communications. Fur-
ther, 20 (12.5%) apps sent information related to location via
messaging, while six (3.7%) apps did the same via Internet.
Finally, we evaluated how the privacy analysis of IoT strings
benefited from the use of NLP. IOTWATCH assigned multi-
ple privacy labels to classify more semantically-complex IoT
strings, which guaranteed completeness in the privacy anal-
ysis. Out of 146 strings analyzed, IOTWATCH applied multi-
labeling to 68 (46.5%). Specifically, 54 IoT strings (36.9%)
received two privacy labels and 14 (9.6%) strings received
three privacy labels. Additional details on the classification
of IoT strings to privacy labels are provided in Appendix D.2.
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Type* App Name Leak Type** Recipient Content Behavior Privacy Labels
1
Squeeze Box Controller [45] I http://$ip:$port “Open box” Device-info
StatHat Quick Start [45] I http://api.stathat.com/ez Thermostat1:thermostat Device-info
ThingSpeak Logger [45] I http://api.thingspeak.com DeviceID:333:Key:123 Device-info
User Lock Manager [45] M defined by user
User no longer has
access to the door
Device-info
User-behavior
Smart Lock [45] M defined by user
SmartLock disabled.
Door will remain
unlocked indefinitely
Device-info
User-behavior
2
Fire Alarm [26] I
http://141.212.110.244/stmalware/
maliciousServer.php – –
Ransomware [26] I
http://141.212.110.244/stmalware/
maliciousServer.php – –
Remote Command [26] I
http://141.212.110.244/stmalware/
maliciousServer.php – –
Spyware [26] M 123−456−7890 Doors locked aftereveryone departed
Device-info
User-behavior
User Event [26] M 123−456−7890 Everyone is awayand Hub ID is 123
Device-info
Location
User-behavior
* 1 is for Market IoT apps and 2 is for Malicious IoT apps (Handcrafted)
** I is for Internet and M is for Messaging. is for Privacy Risk and is for Privacy Preference of a user.
Table 3: Examples of privacy risks and the use of sensitive information in market and malicious IoT apps. IOTWATCH identified
six privacy-violating behaviors and 62 leaks from market and malicious IoT apps.
App
Type
Total
Apps
Analyzed
Messaging
Ccommunications
Analyzed
No. of
Data
Leaks
No. of
Privacy
Concerns
IOTWATCH
Effectiveness
Market 120 54 0 – –
Malicious 40 58 29 – 100%
Total 160 112 29 – 100%
Table 4: Effectiveness of IOTWATCH in detecting sensitive
data leaks using messaging.
App
Type
Total
Apps
Analyzed
Internet
Communications
Analyzed
No. of
Data
Leaks
No. of
Privacy
Concerns
IOTWATCH
Effectiveness
Market 120 12 11 3† 100%
Malicious 40 22 22 3‡ 100%
Total 160 34 33 6 100%
† Includes one privacy concern that does not constitute a data leak and two privacy
concerns that were also flagged as data leaks.
‡ Includes three privacy concerns that were also flagged as data leaks.
Table 5: Effectiveness of IOTWATCH in detecting sensitive
data leaks via Internet communications.
7.2 Analysis of Data Leaks in IoT Apps
We evaluated the correctness of IOTWATCH in identifying data
leaks. Table 3 presents examples of data leaks in IoT apps,
and the associated privacy labels assigned to the leak.
Findings on Data Leaks via Messaging. Table 4 shows IOT-
WATCH’s findings after analyzing messaging recipients. IOT-
WATCH extracted 54 recipients in messages from market apps
and 58 from malicious apps. We found no data leaks via mes-
saging in market apps, meaning, all recipients were defined
(or authorized) by the user at install-time. We believe this
is due the strict review process enforced by SMARTTHINGS
IoT market. Further, we found 29 leaks from 14 different
malicious apps [26], meaning, all these recipients were hard-
coded by a developer and their intent were not defined in the
app’s description block. For instance, the User Event app [26]
leaks privacy labels of type device-info, location, and user-
behavior (“Everyone is away and hub ID is #”) to a hard-coded
phone number. We manually reviewed the app source codes
and verified that all IOTWATCH’s findings were correct. Also,
we verified that all data leaks via messaging were properly
flagged.
Findings on Data Leaks via Internet. Table 5 details the ef-
fectiveness of IOTWATCH’s analyzer in finding data leaks via
Internet communications. IOTWATCH analyzed 34 recipients
from Internet communications, 12 from market and 22 from
malicious apps. Our tool flagged 11 Internet communications
from seven market apps that leak privacy data without user
consent. That is, the user is neither informed about the recip-
ient of the data in the app description block nor enters the
URL or domain name herself. For instance, the ThingSpeak
Logger app [45] transmits a device ID to a remote server
through an HTTP call, which is identified through a device-
info privacy label. For malicious apps, IOTWATCH flagged 22
Internet communications from 14 different malicious apps
as leaks. We manually verified that all IOTWATCH’s findings
were correct. Also, we verified that 100% of data leaks via
Internet were properly flagged.
Findings on Privacy Behaviors via Internet. IOTWATCH
further verifies whether an IoT app protects the sensitive in-
formation before sending it to an external party. The use of
encryption gives the sensitive data extra protection against
unauthorized disclosure to passive eavesdroppers. Out of 12
Internet communications analyzed from market apps, IOT-
WATCH flagged three from three different apps which make
unsecured HTTP requests. Interestingly, one of these calls was
authorized by the user at install-time through the app descrip-
tion block. Coincidentally, our tool also flagged three Internet
communications from three different malicious apps that con-
stituted potential privacy behaviors. Finally, IOTWATCH did
not detect any privacy behavior via messaging.
7.3 Overhead Analysis
We evaluated the performance overhead of IOTWATCH in
terms of runtime and storage overhead.
Runtime Overhead. Latency refers to the time elapsed from
the moment the IoT app sends relevant data via IOTWATCH’s
API (see Section 5.4) to the moment that the user receives
IOTWATCH’s notifications. Latency overhead is calculated as
the average difference in the execution time of the original
and instrumented apps. On the one hand, IOTWATCH required
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Tool
Name Domain
Source Code
Analysis
Dynamic
Analysis
Semantics
Analysis
Privacy
Analysis
NLP/ML
Analysis
User
Awareness
Overhead
Evaluation
Freely
Available
TaintDroid [16] Android
FlowDroid [5] Android
FlowCog [35] Android
FlowFence [18] IoT
ContextIoT [27] IoT
SAINT [10] IoT
ProvThings [52] IoT
iRuler [51] IoT
IOTWATCH IoT
Table 6: Comparison between IOTWATCH and other similar analysis tools for Android and IoT apps.
75 ms to perform the NLP-based classification of the sink-call
contents on average. On the other hand, we implemented IOT-
WATCH’s API using asynchronous HTTPS communications via
the asynchtt p_v1 class defined in SMARTTHINGS [48]. With
this, we obtained a communication latency of 35 ms on av-
erage while supporting encrypted communications that pro-
tected the sensitive information sent to IOTWATCH’s server.
In the end, we found that the total latency introduced by IOT-
WATCH was 105 ms on average.
Storage Overhead. We measured the storage overhead im-
posed by IOTWATCH. Our tool does not store app information
after the analysis is completed; thus, the storage cost is de-
termined by the total storage size of the JSON object used to
exchange information between the IoT apps and IOTWATCH’s
analyzer (Section 6). We evaluated the storage overhead im-
posed by the analysis of 160 IoT apps. On average, IOTWATCH
imposes 1 KB of storage overhead, which we consider negli-
gible.
8 Discussion
IOTWATCH is the first dynamic tool that performs NLP-based
real-time privacy analysis in IoT apps to (1) classify IoT
strings to privacy labels that are easy to understand by the
user, and to (2) flag IoT apps that represent privacy concerns
for the user. We implemented IOTWATCH for SmartThings
IoT platform, and we plan to extend our analysis to other
IoT platforms. Additionally, we analyzed 380 IoT apps and
constructed a dataset to study how these apps use privacy-
sensitive information. While our corpus included IoT strings
extracted from SmartThings market apps, we plan to investi-
gate other IoT platforms to construct similar datasets.
We designed and built IOTWATCH by first understanding
the privacy needs of IoT users. We plan to conduct an ad-
ditional study to evaluate the usability of IOTWATCH which
is outside the scope of the current work. Also, IOTWATCH’s
analysis would benefit from mapping the app descriptions to
privacy labels. However, this is challenging as the descrip-
tion block of an IoT app does not explicitly state the app’s
privacy behavior but its functionality. We plan to use more
advanced NLP techniques to address this challenge. Finally,
IOTWATCH’s execution requires the collection and analysis of
privacy-sensitive information. We use secure HTTPS commu-
nications to protect the communication between IoT apps and
IOTWATCH’s server. In addition, IOTWATCH does not keep
record of any collected information nor share this information
with any third party. As a future work, a complete privacy
assessment of IOTWATCH may be conducted to guarantee that
user’s privacy is completely preserved.
9 Related Work
Information Flow Analysis (IFA) tools have been proposed
for the mobile phone [5, 14, 16, 22, 24, 54] and IoT apps
[9, 10, 17, 38]. Table 6 compares IOTWATCH with current
IFA tools. Though these solutions are effective in identifying
sensitive data flows, most of them either consider security
risks from data flows with tainted variables or via inter-rule
vulnerabilities. FlowCog [35] recently proposed a solution to
address these limitations. Here, the authors establish data flow
dependencies based on Android app view context, which can-
not be extracted from IoT apps due to specific architectural
differences.
There exist a few systems for IoT app data flow analysis.
FlowFence [18] makes the consumers of IoT data declare
their intended activities to enforce data flow policies. More
recently, SAINT, a static analysis tool, is proposed to detect
sensitive data flows in IoT apps [10]. SAINT does not con-
sider sensitive data leaks at runtime and data leaks-through
strings, while FlowFence often over-approximates the data
leaks. Indeed, our analysis showed that 64% of the analyzed
apps leak sensitive data through simple strings that do not
include information from taint variables, yet the strings itself
is sensitive; thus the analysis of strings is required. iRuler [51]
applies NLP techniques to uncover inter-rule vulnerabilities
parsed not from apps, but IoT services. Similarly, the authors
in [25] analyze privacy risks in IoT online recipes. Lastly,
ProvThings [52] uses static and dynamic analysis to collect
data provenance and identify the root cause of attacks in IoT
apps. However, this work is limited to analyze dependencies
between events and data states and does not offer any built-in
privacy analysis.
Differences from Existing Works. IOTWATCH is a novel
dynamic tool that uncovers privacy risks of IoT apps. Con-
sidering the privacy expectations of IoT users, IOTWATCH
instruments IoT apps to collect and analyze the data sent to
external parties in real time. IOTWATCH performs rich NLP-
based classification of IoT strings to four user-friendly privacy
labels, which are also customizable. Also, IOTWATCH ana-
lyzes the recipients of the sensitive information to uncover
data leaks and privacy behaviors. Finally, IOTWATCH imple-
ments notification mechanisms to inform its findings to the
user.
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10 Conclusions
IoT apps access sensitive data that, if leaked, can compromise
the privacy of the users. IoT platforms do not offer real-time
privacy analysis that informs users about how the IoT apps use
sensitive information and what they do with it. In this paper,
we introduced IOTWATCH, a novel dynamic privacy analysis
tool for current IoT apps. We designed and built IOTWATCH
based on a privacy survey with 123 IoT users. IOTWATCH
uses NLP techniques to classify IoT strings extracted from
messaging and Internet communications to a set of privacy
labels at runtime. Additionally, IOTWATCH enables users to
select their privacy preferences and reports its findings based
on their privacy profiles. This allows users to make informed
decisions about their privacy and reject apps. We analyzed 540
real IoT apps to train the NLP model and evaluate its effec-
tiveness. IOTWATCH classifies IoT strings to correct privacy
preferences with an average accuracy of 94.25% and flags
35 apps that leak data. Finally, IOTWATCH imposes minimal
overhead to an IoT app’s execution, introducing on average
105 ms additional latency.
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A Example IoT Privacy Survey Questions
We present a list of representative IoT privacy survey ques-
tions from all the categories. The entire user study can be
found at https://anonymous.com.
A.1 User Characterization
1. Do you use, have used, or are you planning to use any IoT
device?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Maybe
2. What is your technical experience with IoT apps?
( ) I can build, implement, code my own IoT app
( ) Installed/can install/configure an IoT app using the
source code available online
( ) Installed/can install/configure an IoT app’s marketplace
(Google Play, App Store, etc.)
( ) I just know how to press the buttons
( ) I have no idea how to deal with IoT apps
A.2 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart
Apps
1. What information would you consider sensitive if used in
IoT apps/devices? Please check all that apply.
( ) My personal data (e.g., email address, phone number,
residential address, etc.) ( ) Whatever I do, my behavior
(e.g., when I arrive home, when I leave home, I go to
sleep, etc.)
( ) My (or my devices’) location (e.g., my location while
using the apps, etc.)
( ) My device settings/the way I configure the devices (e.g.,
Time of the day the lights turn On/Off, my thermostat
temperature settings, etc.)
( ) My (or my devices’) timing (e.g., the time passed since
I left home, the time passed since I went to sleep, etc.)
( ) Information from my devices (e.g., device type,
manufacturer, device IDs, etc.)
( ) Data from my devices (e.g., door state open or close,
light on or off, etc.)
( ) Other
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If you selected "Other", please explain:
2. Have you heard or personally have privacy concerns on
the use of the IoT devices and systems?
( ) Big concerns ( ) Some concerns
( ) I do not, but I know someone that does
( ) Never thought about it, until now
( ) I do not care
A.3 Privacy Analysis Tools and Features
1. Do you think there is a need for a tool to check for security
privacy risks from the smart apps?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Maybe
2. Would you be willing to use available automatic tools that
analyze and modify smart apps to enable security and
privacy analysis in real-time?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Maybe
B More Details on IOTWATCH’s Instrumentor
In Appendix B, we detail Algorithm 1, which describes the
source code analysis and app instrumentation process in IOT-
WATCH. Our privacy tool requires open access to the IoT apps’
source code (Line 1). This requirement does not constitute a
limitation since several IoT platforms (e.g., SMARTTHINGS,
OpenHAB) make the source code of the apps available on-
line through official and third-party repositories [32, 45, 47].
The first step towards analyzing the apps is to generate the
IR (Line 2) and extract the ICFG (Line 3) of the app. From
there, the app’s data-flow analysis starts by flagging relevant
app and data-flow information (e.g., user-defined data, data-
flow recipients). Then, the automatic instrumentation process
starts by inserting extra code that defines the different IOT-
WATCH-related global variables inside the installed() and
updated() methods (Lines 7, 8, 13, and 14). In that way, IOT-
WATCH always keeps the current value of the flagged data
through all the different node executions. Also, the instru-
mentor implements a UI to define the privacy preferences of
the user (Line 9). Finally, one can notice from Line 22 and
Line 26 that two different methods are inserted to monitor
messaging and Internet communications, respectively.
C IOTWATCH’s Instrumentor Online
We made the instrumentor available online at:
https://IoTWatcH.appspot.com/. Figure 1 depicts de-
tails of the online version of IOTWATCH’s instrumentor. At
Algorithm 1: App source code analysis and code instru-
mentation in IOTWATCH
1: appSC← app source code
{Source Code Analysis}
2: IR← generateIR(appSC)
3: ICFG← generateICFG(appSC)
{Instrumentation}
4: for All ICFG nodes invoking sinks do
5: if node has not been previously visited then
6: if node invokes install method then
7: global← user-defined recipients
8: global← user-defined URLs
9: Implements Privacy Settings UI
10: Flag ICFG node as visited
11: end if
12: if node invokes install method then
13: global← user-defined recipients
14: global← user-defined URLs
15: Flag ICFG node as visited
16: end if
17: if node invokes update method then
18: Update global
19: Flag ICFG node as visited
20: end if
21: if node invokes messaging sink then
22: Insert WatchMsg method
23: Flag ICFG node as visited
24: end if
25: if node invokes Internet sink then
26: Insert WatchInt method
27: Flag ICFG node as visited
28: end if
29: end if
30: end for
the left console, the user inputs the IoT app source code
that needs to be modified to enable IOTWATCH, and at the
right console, the tool automatically returns the IOTWATCH-
instrumented app. Below, we detail the implementation steps
of IOTWATCH.
D Additional Details on IOTWATCH Analyzer
Algorithm 2 details the steps followed in IOTWATCH’s ana-
lyzer. First, in Line 1, the analyzer extracts all the information
received from the IoT app through IOTWATCH’s REST API.
Also, variables are initialized in Lines from 2 to 9. After
IOTWATCH completes the initialization step, the tool applies
multi-class classification on the app’s data-flow contents in
Line 12. Then, it also performs data-flow recipient analysis
by correlating recipients from sink-calls with user-defined
data to detect for privacy behaviors (Lines 14 and 17). Finally,
IOTWATCH’s results are sent back (Line 21) to the user as a
Push Notification.
D.1 More Details on Model Construction
Our search for an adequate corpus that characterizes IoT app’s
data-flows faced particular challenges. First, we could not find
any existing IoT corpus. Second, most of the datasets avail-
able online contain raw unlabeled data that would require a
considerable amount of pre-processing time and resources.
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f2(){ sl.lock()
notifyUser(sl.state, phone)
leakInfo() }
// Send notification to the user
notifyUser(state, number){
sendSMS(“Your lock is: ” + state, phone)
// Leak sensitive data to attacker
leakInfo(){
sendSMS(“Nobody is Home”, 123-456-7890)}
IOTWATCH Analysis Console
Actions Analyze IoT App Publish This App View Recent Apps
…
// Send notification to the user
notifyUser(state, number){
sendSMS(“Your lock is: ” + state, phone) 
sendPush(“App is using data of type:” classification)}
// Leak sensitive data to attacker
leakInfo(){
sendSMS(“Nobody is Home”, 123-456-7890) 
sendPush(“Privacy Behavior using:” classification)}
Analysis Result Stacktrace
iotwatch.appspot.com
Reset Console
Figure 1: The left console is the analysis area where the user inputs the original IoT app. The right console returns
the output of the instrumentation process. We made IOTWATCH’s instrumentor freely available to the community at
https://IoTWatcH.appspot.com/.
Algorithm 2: Sink-call recipient analysis and privacy
classification of IoT strings at runtime
1: inputs← IOTWATCH’s API content
2: userin f o← input.userin f o
3: labels← input.selectedLabels
4: content← input.content
5: recipient← input.recipients
6: url← input.url
7: f lowResult← NULL
8: labelResults← NULL
9: semanticsLabels← NULL
10: for input ∈ inputs do
11: if (content 6= NULL) then
12: labelResult← NLP(content)
13: end if
14: if url is insecure then
15: f lowResult← "privacy concern"
16: end if
17: if recipient /∈ user− in f o then
18: f lowResult← "privacy concern"
19: end if
20: end for
21: sendResults( f lowResult, labelsList)
Third, the privacy labels considered by IOTWATCH could not
be inferred from n-gram shingles extracted from a single
corpus only. Thus, we combined different knowledge-based
datasets to create a larger corpus. We combined the natu-
ral language datasets from Google Books N-grams [20] and
Wikidata [53], which contain strings related to geographic (lo-
cation), economic (devices, user’s goods), climate (location),
and encyclopedic (general knowledge) datasets. We struc-
tured, cleaned, and manually labeled the crawled data. First,
we divided the corpora into single shingles (i.e., n-grams of
n=1). Then, for cleaning purposes, we filtered out punctuation
and stop words. We tested the first NLP model with 61 IoT
strings extracted from 45 market IoT apps [45, 47]. An aver-
age value of 72% accuracy proved that the first considered
model could not accurately represent information extracted
from IoT environments. Based on these results, we decided
to train the NLP model using specific IoT corpora only.
D.2 Assigning Privacy Labels
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the privacy labels dur-
ing evaluation. One can notice that, out of 228 different labels
Label
Category
Messages
without
Leaks or
Privacy
Concerns
Internet
without
Leaks or
Privacy
Concerns
Messages
with
Leaks or
Privacy
Concerns
Internet
with
Leaks or
Privacy
Concerns
Total % Total
Device-info 47 12 43 17 119 52.3
Date-time 7 1 7 0 15 6.6
User-behavior 21 2 34 10 67 29.3
Location 8 0 14 5 27 11.8
Total 83 15 98 32 228 100
Table 1: Distribution of privacy labels used during IOT-
WATCH’s evaluation.
assigned, 52.3% corresponds to device-info, followed by a
29.3% of user-behavior information. We also show in Table
1 the number of labels assigned to the different call types
(i.e., messaging and Internet). For instance, 83 labels were
assigned to strings extracted from messaging that do not leak
information, while 98 labels were assigned to strings extracted
from messaging that leaked information. On the other hand,
Internet communications without privacy concerns received
15 privacy labels while 32 were assigned to Internet commu-
nications that leak data. With this distribution, one can notice
that the majority of labels were assigned to leaked data. These
results reflect on the fact that privacy leakage constitute a
serious problem in IoT.
E Additional Details on IOTWATCH API
Listing 1 illustrates an example of a JSON object used to
send data from an IoT app to IOTWATCH analyzer. Once the
app data is received, the analyzer extracts the data required to
enable recipient analysis and NLP-based classification of the
IoT strings. The API also handles IOTWATCH’s privacy noti-
fications to the user. Once the privacy analysis is completed,
IOTWATCH sends back to the user another JSON object con-
taining its findings (Listing 2). We implemented the API using
the asynchttpv1 class of Samsung SmartThings [48] which
allows asynchronous and encrypted data exchange between
the instrumentor and the analyzer.
F Evaluation Metrics
The performance metrics used during IOTWATCH’s evalua-
tion:
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Evaluation
Metric
Classification Thresholds
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Average
Accuracy 0.9537 0.9623 0.9692 0.9743 0.9623 0.9469 0.9296 0.9092 0.8750 0.9425
Recall 0.9754 0.9400 0.9379 09341 0.8821 0.8419 0.7919 0.7359 0.6263 0.8517
Precision 0.8470 0.8776 0.9163 0.9587 0.9803 0.9833 0.9929 0.9975 0.9835 0.9501
Specificity 0.9283 0.9498 0.9682 0.9772 0.9823 0.9855 0.9876 0.9907 0.9907 0.9734
Table 2: Evaluation metric results in classifying IoT strings for all classification thresholds. The rightmost column presents the
average metrics.
Privacy
Label
No. of Times
Evaluated TP TN FP FN Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity
Device-info 1285 958 232 11 84 0.9260 0.9214 0.9890 0.9547
Date-time 1314 99 1161 18 36 0.9589 0.7333 0.8918 0.9847
User-behavior 1313 508 684 26 95 0.9079 0.8425 0.9585 0.9633
Location 1314 221 1061 10 22 0.9756 0.9095 0.9610 0.9907
Table 3: Evaluation results of IOTWATCH in classifying IoT strings to all the different privacy labels.
Listing 1: An example of a JSON object sent from an IoT app
to IOTWATCH for further analysis.
1 /∗ An example of a JSON object sent to Daint analytics tool ∗/
2
3 data "{
4 ’exfiltration’:{
5 ’texttype’:’PLAIN_TEXT’,
6 ’calltype’:’Messaging’,
7 ’phone’:’111-111-1111’,
8 ’content’:’The door was opened for 10 min’
9 ’userrecipients’:’123-456-7890’,
10 }
11 }" "https://iotwatchanalyticstool.com/classifytext/"
Listing 2: An example IOTWATCH response as a JSON object
received by an IoT app.
1 /∗ An example of a JSON object as response from our analytics tool ∗/
2
3 data "{
4 ’exfiltration’:{
5 ’texttype’:’PLAIN_TEXT’,
6 ’classification’:[’device-info’, ’date-time’]’,
7 ’risklevel’: ’privacy concern’
8 }
9 }"
1. True Positive (TP) represents the number of times a pri-
vacy label is correctly applied to an IoT string for certain
threshold th.
2. True negative (TN) represents the number of times a pri-
vacy label is correctly discriminated for certain threshold
th.
3. False Positive (FP) is the number of times a privacy label
is incorrectly assigned to certain IoT string for certain
threshold th.
4. False Negative (FN) is the number of times a privacy label
is incorrectly discriminated for certain threshold th.
5. Accuracy is the overall ability of IOTWATCH to correctly
apply privacy labels to the IoT string for every different
th.
6. Recall is the ability of the classifier to correctly assign
the privacy labels to a specific IoT string after considering
both the correctly classified and the incorrectly ignored
privacy labels for every value of th.
7. Precision is the ability of our classifier to correctly apply
the privacy labels to a specific IoT string after considering
both the correct and the incorrectly applied privacy labels
for every value of th.
8. Specificity is the ability of our tool to discriminate the
privacy labels for every different th.
The performance metrics are defined by the following equa-
tions:
Accuracy =
(TP +TN)
(TP +TN +FP +FN)
, (1)
Recall =
TP
(TP +FN)
, (2)
Precision =
TP
(TP +FP)
, (3)
Speci f icity =
TN
(TN +FP)
. (4)
G Additional Evaluation Details
Table 2 details average metric values in classifying IoT strings
to privacy labels for every different th. Also, we present the
average metric values after combining results from all con-
sidered privacy labels and thresholds. One can verify that
IOTWATCH obtains the best performance for threshold values
of 0.4, which supports the results showed in Section 7, Figure
7(e). For th values higher than 0.5, the accuracy decreases for
the privacy labels of device-info and user-behavior. This is
mainly because the evaluation of semantically-limited strings
related to these two privacy labels requires more sophisti-
cated analysis. For instance, user-behavior achieved incorrect
or lower classification scores as the string “IoT switched to
sleep mode” cannot be easily related to user activities. We ob-
tained similar results for recall metrics; however, recall values
of date-time are lower compared to other labels. We found
that date-time information could be easily missed from short
strings, which makes the label specially vulnerable to false
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negative events. The precision and specificity improves with
th for all the labels, which denotes a remarkable confidence
of the model for those results with the highest classification
scores. Finally, Table 3 illustrates the performance of IOT-
WATCH in classifying IoT strings for every different privacy
label.
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